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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
HEBER CRONQUIST, aka HEBER 
0. CRONQUIST, and wife, IDELLA 
N. CRONQUIST, 
Plaintiffs and Appellants 
vs. 
UTAH STATE AGRICULTURAL 
COLLEGE, a corporation, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
L. TOM PERRY 
GROVER GILES 
S. D. HUFFAKER 
Attorneys for Defendant 
and Respondent. 
Appeal from the District Court of the First Judicial 
District of the State of Utah, in and for the 
County of Cache. 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
HEBER CRONQUIST, aka HEBER 
0. CRONQUIST, and wife, IDELLA 
N. CRONQUIST, 
Plaintiffs and Appellants 
vs. 
UTAH STATE AGRICULTURAL 
COLLEGE, a corporation, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
In order that the Court n1ay better understand de-
fendant's position in this matter, we desire to call at-
tention to additional facts: 
Olif Cronquist, being possessed of property worth 
approximately $125,000.00, devises to his three children 
property worth approximately $30,000.00 each. Exhibit 
A. pages 3-6: 29-38. The Cronquist farm, situated just 
north of the Utah State Agricultural College in Logan, 
and the only property of the testator under a lease (in-
ventoried at $27,000.00) was bequeathed to the Cache 
Valley Banking Company in trust for twenty years. Ex. 
A. pages 7 4, 108, 119. Olif Cronquist died on April 17, 
1927. 
One-third of the net rentals accruing between de-
cedent's death and December 16, 1933, upon receipt 
there-of by the trustee, were paid to Heber Cronquist. 
Ex. A, 108, 119. 
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Beginning December 16, 1933, and continuing until 
November 25, 1939, Heber's share of the rentals were 
paid, by assignment, to one Fred Lundberg. Ex. A. pages 
120, 140, 148, ·155, 164. On March 10, 1940, on a second 
assignment, Heber"s share was paid to the Cache Valley 
Banking Company. Ex. A. page 172. Between May 20, 
1940, and March 29, 1947, Heber's share of the rentals 
was paid to The First Security Bank to apply on a note 
secured by mortgage on Heber's share of the trust. Ex. A, 
pages 172, 188, 196, 204, 212, 220. 
The lease of the farm expiring in 1944, the College 
sought to purchase other property but in November 
9th of that year, Heber Cronquist and his wife entered 
into an agreement with the Utah State Agricultural 
College for the purchase and sale of his one-third interest 
in the College farm for $10,000.00. Tr. 079, 039. Four 
thousand and no /100 ( $4,000.00) was paid down and 
the balance was to be paid at the termination of the 
trust. Tr. 039. Between the time of the contract and 
the termination of the trust one-third of the rentals 
on the property was, under the contract, paid to Heber 
Cronquist, or assignee. 
He accepted said rentals, retained the $4,000.00 and 
made no protest until he heard that his brother and 
sister, some three years after the making of his agreement 
\vith the College, during a period of inflation, had sold· 
their interest to the College for a higher price. Tr. 066. 
Then for the first time he protests and complains that he 
had no interest in the property and because of having no 
interest therein he could not contract to convey the same 
and his agreement with the College was void. 
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According to his brief, he bases this contention on two 
points: ( 1 ) The trust created was a spendthrift trust, and 
(2) That his interest in the said property being only a con-
tingent remainder therein, he could not make a legal 
contract to assign the same. Tr. 007. 
ARGU:\fENT AND AUTHORITIES 
I 
Dean Griswold of the Harvard Law School in his 
recent work "Spendthrift Trusf' (1947) classes Utah as 
one of the five states of the Union where there is no sta-
tute or case on the subject of spendthrift trust. Pages 
38-270. He points out that the doctrine of spendthrift trust 
is based on public policy and not on sound logic. Gris-
wold: Spendthrift Trust page 634. See also 54 Am. 
Jur. 128; Kelley vs. Kelley 79 Pac. 2d, 1059. 
In the instant case the Court is called upon, for the 
first time to determine a question of public policy. It. 
should base its decision not only on the cases from other 
jurisdictions but also consider the result of a policy, con-
tended by appellant, that would leave title to real property 
in such a condition as to make it impossible for an ex-
aminer of titles to determine when one had an assignable 
interest in real estate. 
Plaintiff has cited a number of cases in support of 
his position that the will of Olif Cronquist created a 
spendthrift trust. A grouping of these cases according to 
the states where the decisions were made and the time 
of the decision is helpful in determing the weight to be 
given them as precedents .for our own count to follow. 
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Such grouping also gives to the court the advantage 
of the experience of other courts dealing with the prob-
lem of "Spendthrift Trusts." It should enable a court, 
dealing with the problem for the first time, to adopt a rule 
of construction that would not be subject to change. 
PENNSYLVANIA 
In an early Pennsylvania case, In Re. Stambaugh, 135 
Pa. 585, 19 Alt. 1058 ( 1890) the court upheld a provision 
in a will as a spendthrift trust where its provisions did not 
expressly so state. In Trask vs. Shaffer ( Pa.) 14 Alt. 
(2nd) 211, ( 1940) the will provided; 
''To my son, Herman Shaffer, one-seventh of my 
estate, which part I direct that my executor place in 
a trust or other fund that will be completely admin-
istered. This fund to be established on basis that 
this heir, Herman Shaffer, receive the annual income 
earned by it; and in addition $200.00 annually from 
the principal sum of the fund, or more if, in the 
judgment of the officers of the trust, such increase in 
the amount is needful and advisable." 
At the death of Herman Shaffer, the remainder of 
the trust, created for his benefit, was to be divided equally 
arnong his heirs. Another son was given an identical 
trust and the five children of the testator each got a one-
seventh share to be paid to them direct. The First Nat-
tiona! Bank was appointed trustee. 
Plaintiff, holder of the judgment against Herman 
Shaffer, garnisheed the bank. The lower court held that 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
5 
a spendthrift trust had been created and was not subject 
to garnishment, basing its decision on the early Stam-
baugh case. 
The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the 
Lower Court saying, 
"There is no semblance of uniformity among 
other jurisdictions as to the rule of construction to 
be applied in determining whether a testamentary 
provision operates as a spendthrift trust. A rule of 
excessive liberality in favor of a spendthrift tn1st was 
applied In Re: Stambaugh's Estate, 135 Pa. 585. 
In ~'lcCurdy vs. Bellefont Trust Company, 292 Pa. 
407, the Supreme Court referred to the case of Stam-
bauglis Eestate as an extreme case, repudiated its 
doctrine, and arrested the trend in direction of lib-
erality, retraced its steps and established the applic-
able rule firmly on conservative ground. The Stam-
baugh case is no longer reliable authority in Pennsyl-
. ,, 
van1a. 
Thus Pennsylvania, In adopting the rule of liberal 
construction contended for by appellant, was forced in 
the light of later experience, to reverse its early decision. 
Reversal of decisions, on matters affecting title to real 
estate,. should be avoided where ever possible. 
ILLINOIS 
Plaintiff's brief places great reliance on three early 
decisions of the Supreme Court of the State of Illinois, 
namely, ( 1) Bennett vs. Bennett, 217 Ill. 434; 75 NE 
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339; 4 L.R.A.N .S. 470; and ( 2) Wallace vs. Foxwell, 250 
Ill. 616; 95 NE 985; 50 L.R.A.N.S. 632, decided in 1911, 
and (3) Wagner vs. Wagner, (Ill.) 91 NE 66. 
In Bennett vs. Bennett, ( 1905) the case arose on the 
petition of the benficiary asking the Court to require the 
trustee to pay him the corpus of trust prior to the time 
designated in the will for such corpus to be paid. The 
Coutt refused the petition on the ground that it was a 
spendthrift trust. 
In Wallace vs. Foxwell, ( 1911) the beneficiary had 
been adjudicated bankrupt, his interest in the trust pro-
perty sold to the Second National Bank of St. Paul. The 
trustee asked for a direction from the Court as to whether 
the beneficary or the bank was entitled to the income from 
the trust property. The Court decided that the trust was 
in the nature of a spendthrift trust and nothing passed 
to the bank from the bankruptcy sale. 
In O'HARE vs. JOHNS.TON (Ill.) 113 N.E. 127, 
( 1916) the testator placed in trust, bonds of the value 
of $100,000.00. He directed that the trustee collect the 
income and pay one-half to his son and the other half to 
his daughter. At the end of a 30 year period, if both 
children were living, the principal was to be divided 
equally between them. In the event of the death of 
either son or daughter, before the expiration of the trust 
period, leaving issue, the income and principal, at the 
end of the trust period was to be given to the issue. 
The facts of the case are so similar to the facts in the 
Cronquist will,. and appellant has placed such reliance on 
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the decisions of the Supren1e court of Illinois, it may be 
\Visdom to present a direct quotation from the decision 
of the Court in the matter. 
"But it is further argued that the entire fourth 
clause of the will is a spendthrift trust provision for 
the testator's children and grandchildren for a period 
of 30 years, and that fact argues strongly for the 
contingency of the gift. A spendthrift trust is 
created with a view of providing a fund for the 
maintenance of another and at the same time secur-
ing it against his own in1providence or incapacity. 
Directions against alienation by the voluntary act of 
the beneficiary or through legal process by creditors 
are the usual incidents of such tn1sts. (citing author-
ities.) 
"There is nothing in the wording of the will itself 
as to this trust that indicates that it is of a spend-
thrift character. We find no restraint on alienation 
and no discretion as to the payment of the income or 
the principal. It is true there is evidence tendil)g to 
show that the testator had expressed doubts as to the 
son settling down in business as to whether he would 
be able to take care of himself, and stating that the 
daughter while in school, had been accustomed to 
spend a good deal of .money which the father had 
provided, that she was under age at the time the will 
was drawn; and that both son and daughter had 
depended on their father for support. But it is also 
true that this fund referred to the . grandchildren as 
well as the children, and the testator, naturally, could 
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not form an idea as to whether they would need the 
protection of a spendthrift trust. It is the intention 
of the testator that decides, under the authorities, 
the character of the trust. If it is shown that his inten-
tion indicates a spendthrift trust, the court will not in-
quire whether the beneficiary is, if fact, a spend-
thrift. The will does not indicate that the testator 
thought his children were spendthrifts. He gave to 
each of them valuable real estate and a large amount 
of other property. In addition to this he gave them 
the income from the trust fund, which tends strong to 
show that he had no suspicions or apprehensions as 
to their ability to handle their own property." 
Then came the case of Commissioner of Internal 
Revenue vs. Blair, 60 Federal 2nd, 340; decided in 1932: 
"By his will decedent created a trust estate and 
named as trustees hereof his nephew Chauncey J. 
Blair and his son Edward T. Blair. By the terms of 
the trust the wife of the testator was to receive one-
half of the net income of the trust estate during her 
life, and taxpayer (son of said testator) was to re-
ceive theother half during his life, and, after the 
death of testator's wife, taxpayer was to receive the 
whole net income of the trust during his life. 
Clause 20 of decedent's will reads as follows: 
"I do hereby declare and direct that the income from 
trust fund and estate which is herein ordered to be, 
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fron1 tin1e to tin1e as the same shall be received, paid 
to n1y said \Yife and to my said son and to his said 
,vife and to their children and descendants of chil-
dren in the cases aforesaid shall be paid to them 
directly upon their separate order and receipt there-
for, for their sole and separate use respectively, and 
that the sa1ne shall not be nor be made nor held in any 
n1anner nor by any proceedings whether in law or 
equity while yet in the hands of said trustees liable 
for or subject to the payment of any of the debts or 
obligations of either of the persons entitled to the 
same as above herein set forth." 
The son Edward T. Blair assigned his interest in the 
income from the trust property. The Boarl of Tax Ap-
peals decided that the net income from the estate accruing 
subsequently to the assignment was not taxable to Edward 
T. Blair the assignor. 
On appeal the ruling of the Tax Board was reversed, 
the Court holding that Ed\vard T. Blair had no power to 
make an assignment of the income of the trust. It based 
its decision on the previous cases of Bennett vs. Bennett, 
Wallace vs. Foxwell (ante) and others. 
Mter the earlier cases, a Mr. Kales of the Illinois Bar 
wrote a textbook on "Estates, Future Interests, and Re-
strainst on Alientaion in Illinois" in which he took issue 
with the decisions of the Illinois Courts in Bennett vs. 
Bennett and Wallace vs. Foxwell and offered some very 
pertinent and constructive criticisms of the doctrine of 
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spendthrift trust as interpreted by the Illinois Courf. 
The Federal Court, however, in its decision declared it 
was only concerned with the law of the State of Illinois 
as the Illinois Courts had interpreted it, whether the 
interpretation be right or wrong was beside the question. 
It, therefore, adhered to the doctrine as expressed in 
Bennett vs. Bennett and Wallace vs. Foxwell (ante), and 
decided the will created a spendthrift trust. 
Before paying the tax, however, the trustee, in the 
case of Blair vs. Blair, 274 Ill. App. 23, asked for declara-
tory judgment construing the will. This case was decided 
in 1934 and, therefore, represents the modern trend of the 
law of spendthrift trusts. 
While the Illinois Court does not expressly repud-
iate the earlier decisions of Bennett vs. Bennett and 
Wallace vs. Foxwell, ·it declares that none of them in-
volved an alienation of the trust fund by beneficiary. 
The Court then adopts the theory of Mr. Kales by; 
basing i~s opinion upon the following quotation from 
"Kales on Future Interests" at Page 861: 
"A mere trusteeship, even though for the protec-
tion of the beneficiaries, ought not as a matter of 
l"Taken as a whole, the foregoing cases show as well marked as instances 
as any, where our Supreme Court actually interprets the instruments by 
·finding not what the testator expressed in words but what was the in-
tention of his inducen1ent. The object and purpose of the inducement in 
these cases apparently made not merely the standard of interpretation but 
th.e very subject matter to be interpreted. This position has been taken 
without any apparent appreciation by the Court of a complete departure 
from the fundamental principles of interpreting writings which it in-
volved." Kales Future Interests, Paragraph 748. 
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taste, if for no other reason, be called a spendthrift 
trust. Only where this is added to the trusteeship 
express restraints on alienation is it justifiable to call 
the creation a spendthrift trust. Whether restaints 
on alienation, voluntary or involuntary, or both, are 
added ought to be determined by the application of 
the usual principles of consbuction to the language 
used. If the restraints are not expressed, no amount 
of extrinsic evidence or speculation and conjecture 
as to the testators or settler's inducements ought to 
be 'permitted to it into the will or settlement.'" 
The Court then continues: 
"If the testator had intended to restrict voluntary 
alienation by his son, this could have been readily 
accomplished by the use of a very few words. That 
he did not use such words is strong evidence that 
he did not so intend. Words even of doubtful mean-
ing should not be construed as to inject an intention 
into the will ma~ifestly contrary to that of the testa-
tor.'' 
The case then went up to the Supreme Court of the 
United States because of the conflict between the State 
Court in Blair vs. Blair, 274 Ill. App. 23, and Commis-
sioner of Internal Revenue vs. Blair, 60 Federal 2nd, 343. 
Chief Justice Hughes delivered the opinion of the Court 
saying: 
"Second. The question of the validity of the 
assignments is a question of local law. The donor 
was a resident of Illinois and his disposition of thP 
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property in that State was subject to its law. By that 
law the character of the trust, the nature and extent 
of the interest of the beneficiary, and the power of 
the beneficiary to assign that interest in whole or in 
part, are to be determined. The decision of the state 
court upon these questions is final. Spindle vs. 
Shreve, Ill. U. S. 542, 547, 548, 28 L. ed. 512-514, 4 S. 
Ct. 522; U terhart vs. United States, 240 U. S. 598, 
603, 60 L. ed. 819, 821, 36 S. Ct. 417; Poe vs. Sea-
born, 282 U. S. 101, 110, 75 L. ed. 239, 243, 51 S. Ct. 
58; Freuler vs. Helvering, supra ( 219 U.S. p. 45, 78 
L. ed. 641, 54 S. Ct. 308). It matters not that the 
decision was by an intermediate appellate court. 
Compare Graham v. White-Phillips Co. 296 U.S. 27, 
80 L. ed 20, 56 S. Ct. 21, 102 A.L.R. 24. In this 
instance, it is not necessary to go beyond the obvious 
point that the decision was in a suit between the 
trustees and the beneficiary and his assignees, and 
the decree which was entered in pursuance of the 
decision determined as between these parties the 
validity of the particular assignments. Nor is there 
any basis for a charge that the suit was collusive and 
the decree inoperative. Freuler v. Helvering, supra. 
The trustees were entitled to seek the instructions of 
the court having supervision of the trust. That court 
entertained the suit and the appellate court with the 
first decision of the Circuit Court of Appeals before 
it, reviewed the decisions of the Supreme Court of 
the State and reached a deliberate conclusion. To 
derogate from the authority of that conclusion and 
. of ·the decree it commanded, so far as the question 
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is one of state law, would be wholly unwarranted in 
the exercise of federal jurisdiction." 
'1n the face of this ruling of the state court it is 
not open to the Governn1ent to argue that the trust 
··was, tmder the Illinois law, a spendthrift trust." 
The point of the argument is that, the trust being of 
that character, the state law barred the voluntary 
alienation by the beneficiary of his interest. The 
state court held precisely the contrary. The ruling 
also detremines the validity of the assignment of the 
beneficiary of parts of his interest. That question 
was necessarily presented and expressly decided." 
Blair vs. Commission of Internal Revenue 300 U.S.S.,5 
81 L. Ed. 465. 
Would it not be wisdom, in interpreting the in-
tention of the testator, Olif Cronquist, to adopt a rule 
of construction, that withstands the test of time. 
CALIFORNIA 
In Seymour vs. McAvoy, 53 Pac. 946 ( 1898), an 
action was brought to subject the interests in a certain 
trust to the claim of creditors. While the will creating 
the trust contained no express restriction against alien-
ation, it did provide the following purposes: 
" ( 2) To provide out of the income thereof for 
the comfort, support, and maintenance of my beloved 
wife. 
" ( 1 ) To provide out of the income thereof for 
port and education of my two daughters." 
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The pertinent part of the decision is found in head-
note No.2 which reads as follows: 
"The author of a trust to pay to another the in-
come of property may at common law provide that 
the interest of the beneficiary shall not be subject to 
the claims of his creditors, and such provision need 
not be expressed, but may be implied from the terms 
of the trust in the light of all the circumstances." 
While the case marks the beginning of a liberal inter-
pretation in favor of spendthrift trusts in the State of 
California, it should not be authority to go beyond the 
terms therein stated. 
In Re Blakes Estate, 108 Pac. 287, has more to do 
with the alienation of a contingent remainder and will be 
discussed later. 
The case of Fletcher vs. Los Angeles Trust & Savings 
Bank, 187 Pac. 425, was an action to determine a trust. 
The real question involved was whether a woman of the 
age of 54 was presumed to be sterile. Such a presumption 
exists in England but not in ~e United States. 
With respect to the will of George C. Kimball 
being interpreted by the Court, the Court declared: 
"Where the trust is a spendthrift trust, or where 
the settlor made known, expressly or plainly: his 
intention that such power should not exist, or where 
discretion as to the amount of the income to be de-
voted to the needs of the beneficiary is vested in the 
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trustee, or where the effect of the trust is to direct ac-
cunlulations of the income until a fixed time, the 
tn1st cannot be terminated by the court during the 
pe1iod fixed by the trustor, even where all the bene-
ficiaries are sui juris and consent thereto. There is 
nothing, however, in the tn1st created by the will of 
George C. Kimball which brings it within any of the 
foregoing \veil-recognized limitations." 
In Re DeLano>s Estate, cited by appellant the testator 
twice used the word "Spendthrift Trust" in his will. The 
court in interpreting the will said: 
''There was no provision against alienation by 
the benficiary of their interest in the trust property 
nor did the will specifically declare that the trust was 
made for their support, maintenance and welfare but 
the purpose of the testator is no less clear because of 
these admissions. It was disclosed by the use of the 
terms 'Spendthrift Trust/ which has a well under-
stodd legal meaning.>' 
The above named California cases cited by plain-
tiff should be supplemented by a very careful consider-
ation of the case of Kelley vs. Kelley, 79 Pac. 2d 1059 
( 1938). In this case the beneficiary had made an assign-
ment of his interest in a trust estate which had already 
been held by the Courts to be a spendthrift trust. The 
plaintiff brought suit on the assignment and the defendant 
set up the invalidity of the assignment on the grounds 
that it was a spendthrift trust. The Lower Court held 
for the defendant but the Supreme Court reversed the 
decision declaring: 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
16 
-"We find no requirement of public policy which 
preclude their application here or compel the pro-
tection of the proceeds of a spendthrift trust after 
they have reached the hands of the beneficiary from 
the incidents of an otherwise valid engagement en-
tered into during the life of the trust." 
While California, has never extended its rule of 
construction to the liberal extent contended for by ap-
pellant, in the Kelley case it reveals an intent to limit even 
its conservative view by permitting an action for damage~ 
for breach of contract (on the part of beneficiary under 
an express spendthrift trust) to alienate his interest. 
Thus the Courts of Pennsylvania, Illinois, and Cal-
ifornia, who in the early days of 1ugged indvidualism 
departed from the English rule and sustained the valid-
ity of spendthrift trust, and in such departure adopted 
the extreme view that the testator did not need to create 
the spendthrift trust by express words have in recent years 
repudiated their early decisions by holding that the in-
tention to create the spendthrift .tn1st ought clearly to 
appear in the instrument creating the trust. 
The case of Jones vs. Harrison, 7 Federal 2nd, 461, 
on which plaintiff places such great re~iance can be dis-
tinguished from the case at bar. In Jones vs. Harrison, 
a petition in bankruptcy was filed by the trustee to se-
quester for the benefit of creditors the interest of the 
bankrupt in the trust estate created by will. The petition 
was resisted by the trustees under the will. The Court 
granted the petition holding that the will created a 
spendthrift trust. It based its decision on three points: 
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( 1) "Courts have held that the fact of placing 
property in the hands of a trustee evidences intent 
on the part of the testator to put it beyond the power 
of the beneficiary to alienate. 
( 2) Turning, now, to the will which is here 
rmder consideration, there is but a single item in its 
language which expresses an intent of the testator to 
impose restrictions upon the beneficiary's interest. 
That is fotmd in the use of the word "direct," as to 
the income accruing between the beneficiary's 
twenty-fifth and thirty-fifth year. The will requires 
this income to be paid by the trustees to the bene-
ficiary "direct." This fairly imports that such pay-
ments were not to be made to alienees or to creditors. 
This language, however, is not used with respect to 
the payment of any other income, or to the payments 
out of the capital of the trust. 
( 3) Looking now to the circumstances and to 
all the provisions of the will, the Court finds as a 
further ground in support of the restriction that a 
large part of the estate was placed absolutely under 
th " 1" e son s contro . 
Two elements of the Cronquist will are similar to the 
will interpreted by the Court in Jones vs. Harrison: ( 1 ) 
The property was placed in the hands of the trustee, and 
( 2) The testator bequeathed part of the property to the 
son absolutely and another part to a trustee. 
The Cronquist will, however, does not contain the 
third element which to the Federal Court was the es-
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sential element, namely, that the money was to be paid 
direct to the beneficiary. " 
When we consider. that the Federal Court in Jones 
vs. Harrison based its decision on the cases from Illinois 
and when we further consider that the Illinois Court, 
distinguishes between cases brought to set aside a con-
tract by the beneficiary and an action to make the bene-
ficiary's interest subject to his debts, and :when we further 
consider that in Jones vs. Harrison the will provided that 
the money was to be paid direct to the beneficiary the 
case of Jones vs. Harrison is but little aid to a Court 
which is called upon to interpret the Cronquist will. 
KANSAS 
Plaintiffs cite two decisions from the State of Kansas 
in support of his position that the will of Olif Cronquist 
created a spendthrift trust. The first is Everitt vs. Has-
kins, 171 Pac 632. In this case the will provided: 
"The share of my son William Henry, as pro-
vided herein, shall not be given into his control,. but 
shall be put into the hands of my executor, Wm. M. 
Peck, as trustee for my said son. Said trustee shall 
invest and manage the same, as to him seems best, 
and pay to my said son the sum of three hundred 
dollars ( $300.00) per annum, in semi-annual install-
ments of $150.00 each, but such amount may be in-
creased to whatever may be considered necessary, 
by the trustee, by any change in condition of said 
William Henry, to an amount sufficient for his com-
fort. Such amount to be paid by the executor, or 
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trustee, out of any money thus coming to him, 
whether 'income, increase, or the corpus of the estate 
so given; it being my intention that he shall have, 
as above provided, the said sum of three hundred 
dollars, or more if necessary, per year, so long as there 
shall remain any property herein given him from 
which to pay it. Should there be any of the estate 
herein given to my son William Henry remaining at 
his death, it shall be paid over and conveyed by the 
trustee to the heirs of said William Henry. It is my 
tvill and I hereby direct, that in no event shall any of 
my estate ever be given to the husbands, eithef'. 
present or future, of my daughters, but shall be kept 
free from· such hubands, during the life of my said 
daughters, and, if any remains of their respective 
shares at their death, it shall go to their heirs, other 
than their husbands,, (italics· supplied) 
That portion of the will in italics was taken by the 
Court to show an intention on the part of the testator to 
limit the power of creditors to levy on the beneficiary's 
interest. But no such provision is found in the Cronquist 
will. There is no intimation that the bequest is for the 
support of the plaintiff. Nor is there a provision that 
the part not needed for the support of Heber goes to an-
other at the end of the trust period. 
The trend of the Kansas Court is in the same direction 
as the the Courts of Pennsylvania, I_llinois, and California. 
In Re Watts Kan. 162 P. (2nd) 82 (1945), the will of 
Nlary D. Watts provided for the creation of a trust and 
directed that the trustees pay Corwin Grant Watts at such 
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thnes as to them may seem necessary such sums of money 
as shall in their judgment be necessary for the proper 
1naintenance, support, and education of the said Corwin 
Grant Watts and at the age of 21 years, corpus of the pro-
perty was to be turned over to Corwin Grant Watts if 
in the judgment of the tJustees he had attained suffic-
ient business judgment to handle the property. The 
Court pointed out that as the will created a discretionary 
trust as distinguished from a spendthrift trust and that 
the trust property was not liable to satisfy a judgment 
against Corwin Grant Watts for alimony. 
'The decisions of the Kansas courts, will be further 
discusse~ under Part III of this brief where they properly 
belong, but this observation is now pertinent. Had the 
Kansas Court in the early case of Everitt vs. Haskins fully 
appreciated the distinction between a 'spendthrift' and a 
'discretionary' trust the case of Everitt vs. Haskins could 
never be referred to in a discussion of the subject of 
spend thrift trusts. 
Summing up the authorities cited by plaintiff in his 
brief, we are willing to admit that the American Courts 
generally sustain the validity of spendthrift trusts when 
the trust instrument clearly expresses such an intention. 
We can further concede that there is some authority to 
the effect that the restraint against alienation by the 
beneficiary need not be stated in express terms. WE 
VIGOROUSLY CONTEND, HOWEVER, THAT 
THERE IS NOTHING IN THE CRONQUIST WILL 
FROM WHICH IT MAY BE EVEN INFERRED THAT 
THE TESTATOR INTENDED TO LIMIT THE 
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PO\VER OF HIS BENFICIARIES TO AGREE TO 
CONVEY THEIR INTEREST IN THE TRUST ES-
TATE. 
~~Iany cases could be cited to support our position 
but for sake of brevity we quote from text writers who 
have reviewed all the cases and conclude as follows: 
"But there is a. noticeably tendency in the de-
cisions of today, as compared with. those of a genera-
tion ago, to require that the intention to create a 
spendthrift trust appear clearly in the instrument."' 
Griswold, "Spendthrift Trusts," page 300. 
c:'Courts have occasionally held that trusts were 
spendthrift trusts when it was exceedingly difficult 
if not impossible to find an indication in the terms 
of the trust that the settler intended any such limi-
tation on the interest of the beneficiary. These cases 
deserve no following. The intention to establish the 
spendthrift trust ought clearly to appear in the in-
strument creating the trust, for, as more than one 
court has observed, any other rule, c:would in effect 
saying that all life estates of like character, given 
in trust, are incapable of being alienated.' There 
should be specific language declaring the trust a 
spendthrift trust or language from which such in-
terest might reasonably be inferred. A mere trustee-
ship is not enough to rnake a spendthrift trust. Gris-
wold, "Spendthrift Trusts," pages 303-304. 
c:'An intention to create a spendthrift trust which 
the beneficiary cannot assign nor any of his creditors 
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disturb is manifested by a provision to the effect that 
all moneys paid to apy beneficiary shall be paid into 
his hands and not into the hands of any other person, 
without the right of anticipation, a provision for pay-
ment to the beneficiary for his support on his re-
ceipt, and that the beneficiary should have no power 
to charge, encumber, or anticipate the income; a pro-
vision for payment into the hands of the beneficiary 
and not upon any written or verbal order or upon 
any assignment or transfer; or by a provision that 
the beneficiary shall not be entitled at any time to 
alieniate, anticipate, or encumber his share of the in-
come or principal, and that the same shall not be 
liable for his debts. __ But no intention to impose a 
restraint on the alienation of income is to be found, it 
has been ruled, merely from a direction that thp 
trustee should apply it to the support and mainten-
ance of the beneficiary.:~:~ 54 Am. Jur. 125. 
"There is no presumption that every trust to 
pay over income is a spendthrift trust." Bogert on 
Trusts, Voll, Par. 225. 
"To create a valid spendthrift trust the language of 
the founder must be clear and unequivocal to that effect." 
25 R. C. L. page 357. 
"Every alleged spendthrift trust must be judged 
on its own facts. No formula is needed to create 
such a trust, and no prescription can be given for 
establishing one, except the use of clear and simple 
language prohibiting alienation of the cestui's in-
terest." Bogert Trusts, Vol. 1, page 739. 
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"The general rule that the extent or interest 
of the cestui que trust will be controlled by the pro-
visions of the trust instrument applies to spendthrift 
trusts but there is a presumption against the creation 
of a spendthrift trust unless either words to that 
effect are set forth or the clear and undoubted in-
tention to the same end is n1anifested by the terms 
of the instrument. Where the property is conveyed 
to the trustee in fee simple in trust for the beneficiary 
until he arrives at a certain age, at which time it is 
-conveyed to him absolutely, no spendthrift trust is 
created.'' 65 C. J. 542. 
We supplement these statements by: Trash vs. 
Shaffer (ante); Blair vs. Blair (ante); Kelley vs. Kelley 
(ante), and the following other cases: 
NEWELL v. TUBBS, (Colo.) 84 Pac. 2d, 820, 
( 1939 ). 
Action by Newell against Tubbs to annul an assign-
ment by plaintiff to defendants of plaintiff's interest under 
a trust. The will provided that the income from the trust 
estate was to be used for the education of the great-
grandchildren of the testator, the principal ultimately to 
be divided among the beneficiaries. 
Teseator died in 1925, Newell, a great-grandson, on 
February 7, 1934, for a valuable consideration, executed 
a written assignment of his interest in the trust estate to 
Tubbs. 
Court found in favor of the defendant saying, "A 
spendthrift trust is 'a trust created to provide a fund for 
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the maintenance of the beneficiary, and at the same time 
to secure it against his improvidence or incapacity.;, 65 C. 
J. 230. Clear and unequivocal language is necessary to 
create such a trust or, in the absence of such language, 
the intention to create must clearly appear from the lang-
uage of the entire instrument. 65 C. J. 265. In the doc-
ument under consideration in the instant case we find 
none of these requisites." 
POOL vs. CROSS COUNTRY BANK, 199 Ark 144, 
133 s.w. 19, ( 1939). 
Cross Country Bank brought suit to foreclose trust 
deed executed by John D. and Anne B. King, given to 
secure note of grantors. Property came to King by will 
of his mother :which provided: 
All property to trustees to hold for son, J. D. King. 
Pay son $100.00 per n1onth or more if sick, income free 
from debts. If son dies and leaves issue, then income to 
son. All parties interested had quitclaimed to son. 
Held no restraint on alienation. "A mere trustee-
ship, even though it is for the protection of the benficiar-
ies, ought not, as a matter of taste, if for no other reason, 
be called a spendthrift trust. Only where there is added 
to the trusteeship express restraints on alienation, it is 
justifiable to call the creation a spendthrift trust." 
Foreclosure was permitted. 
MII.JLER vs. MARYLAND CASUALTY COMPANY, 
(Ark.) 180 S. W. 581, ( 1944). 
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"Although one may limit the grant, presun1ption of 
law in that he has not done so unless there are express 
words, or a clear and undoubted intention is expressed 
in the will.n 
BAKER vs. KEISER, 75 Md., 332, 23 Atl. 735. 
In tn1st to daughter for life, then to children. Action 
bv creditors for income. 
J 
In the opinion the court used this language: 
"Without importing words into that will which 
are not there, and imputing an intention to the tes-
tator of which he has given no intimation by any 
verbal expression, we cannot say that the income 
was not and is not assignable by the life tenant; and 
if it is, there was error in holding it to be beyond the 
reach of creditors. Any other construction of this 
will and ruling in this case would be in effect saying 
that all life estates of like character, given in trust, 
are incapable of being alienated." 
. PICKENS vs. DORRIS, 20 Mo. App. 1, 
Here property given trustee to pay income to chil-
dren. 
The Court refused to impose a restriction upon 
the tn1st saying: 
"There is nothing in the will itself which would 
indicate that trust thus created was in the nature of 
a spendthrift trust and to seek in the surounding 
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circumstances a reason for declaring it to be such, 
the authorities do not warrant and sound policy for-
bids.~ 
NUN vs. FITCHE-GOETTENGER, 245 S. W. 421. 
"According to great weight of authority, how-
ever, where instrument creating the trust contains 
no expressive words of restraint and nothing on its 
face declaring that the purpose of the trust is to pro-
vide a support of the beneficiary or furnish him with 
the comforts of life, and where it is declared that 
and where it requires that the· income from the trust 
shall be paid directly to the beneficiary without any 
discretion in the trustee as to time or amount of 
payment or the purpose for which they shall be ap-
plied, such revenue may be anticipated or assigned 
by the beneficiary." 
We may conclude that the modern decisions are 
unanimous in holding that a mere trusteeship is insuffic-
ient to show an intention to create a spendthrift trust. 
II. 
In as much as the third subdivision of appellant's 
brief is more closely related to the first subdivision than 
the second, I shall discuss part III before part II . 
. Part III of Appellant's brief approaches the very 
core of the question in this case, viz; 
What provisions in the Cronquist will evidences an 
intent on the part of the testator to prevent his children 
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from selling or contracting to sell, t4eir interests in the 
trust property? But it is only an approach-plaintiff does 
not follow through. 
· Throughout plaintiff's brief only two provisions of 
the \viii are cited to show that the testator intended to 
prevent his children from alienating the trust property. 
First: The provision that the property was placed 
in trust. (Appellant's Brief pages 26 and 27. ) This con-
tention has already been disposed of. 
Second. The provision that part of the property was 
given to the children direct and part placed in trust. 
(Brief, page 10.) 
It is true that two other arguments are made. One 
that the testator created. an estate of such nature that 
made it unassignable_. That argument will be ·answered 
in Part III of this brief. The other is that the very fact 
that the children tried to sell their trust estate after the 
death of the testator. This final argument is not based 
on the will itself but springs from facts outside of the will. 
This last contention has such little weight that it may 
be disposed of at this time. In fact in his brief, appellant, 
provides his own refutation. (Brief pages 10 and 11.) 
If the "mere circumstance that the plaintiff survived the 
trust period cannot be permitted to alter the testator's 
intent'" it would be just as true that the mere circumstance 
that the plaintiff tried to borrow money six years after 
the death of the testator should not be permitted to alter 
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the intent of he testator at the time he made his will. 
One cannot change a testamentary intent of date of April 
11, 1927 by showing an act of a third person on Dec. 16, 
1933. 
The second provision found in the will itself, from 
which appellant argues for a spendthrift trust is stated 
as follows: 
"The very fact that testator gave each of his three 
children a substantial portion of his estate and put the 
balance, also a substantial portion, in trust," shows an 
intent on his part to limit their powers to sell the same. 
But we must remember that the portion that was placed 
in trust was the only property of the testator under lease. 
The Cronquist farm (or trust property) had been leased 
to the Utah State Agricultural College for a long time and 
the lease had ·many years to run. The rental on this 
lease was to be split three ways. Someone had to be 
appointed to collect the rent and distribute the income. 
the most likely person to make such distribution was the 
Cache Valley Banking Company, the person named as 
executor. 
We also call attention to the fact that in O'Hara vs. 
Johnson, (Ill.) 113 NE 127, the Court reasons: 
"Inasmuch as the testator gave each of then1 
valuable real estate· and a large amount of other pro-
perty. In addition to this he gave them the income 
from the trust fund which tends strongly to show 
that he had no suspicion or apprehension as to their 
ability to hold their own property." 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
29 
See Black vs. Jones 264 Ill. 548, 106 N.E. 462. 
The reasoning of plaintiff on this point deserves the 
criticism that Mr. Kales gave the Illinois Courts. See 
Note 1, page 10. 
~o say that because the testator gave part of his 
property in trust and part direct shows that he did not 
trust his children and then to reason that the lack of con-
fidence in the financial ability of his children was an 
inducement to give part in trust and part direct and from 
that conclude that the testator intended to create a spend-
thrift trust, may trick one to a conclusion based on con-
fusion. But it should not stand in the way of clear 
thinking and be used to show that testator did not want 
his children to sell their interest. ·If he wanted to re-
strict them, why did he not say so? Words to show such 
an intention were at his command. 
Ill 
Part two of plaintiff's brief discloses another question, 
namely, Apart from any question as to the intention 
of the testator to prohibit alienation by a beneficiary of 
his interest, did the testator create an estate of such a 
nature that it could not be alienated? Plaintiff's answer 
to this question is as follows: 
"One of the determining factors in a case of this 
kind is, whether the testator has devised the legal 
title in the trust property to the trustee to hold dur-
ing the trust period. If that fact definitely appears 
from the language of the trust instrument then the 
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Courts hold that the beneficiary has no vested in-
terest in the trust res, which he can alienate or dis-
pose of during the trust period. In Re: Blakes 
Estate, (Cal.) 108 Pac. 287; Meek vs. Briggs, 98 
Iowa 610; Richardson vs. Warfield, 148 N. E. 141; 
Everett vs. Haskins, ( Kan.) 171 Pac. 632; Watts· vs. 
McKay, (2nd) (Kan. 162 P. 82); Jones vs. Harrison 
7 F. (2d) 467. 
This statement does violence to the fundamental law 
of trusts and it is not even supported by the authorities 
quoted. 
"In absence of provisions in the trust instruments 
or statutes to the contrary, the cestui trust may 
alienate his interests as freely as he might a legal 
estate or interest. The consent of trustee is not 
necessary."'' Bogert Trusts, Vol. 1 Paragraph 188. 
"Both in England and in the United States to-
day it is clear that the beneficiary of a trust, unless 
he is under legal incapacity, can transfer his interest 
under the trust, unless his interest is made unalien-
able by the terms of the trust or by statute. He can 
transfer his interest to a third person, to a co-bene-
ficiary, or to the trustee. As was said by the court 
in New Jersey; ''Trust estates are subject to the 
same incidents, properties, and consequences as, 
under like circumstances, belong to similar estates 
in law. They are alienable, devisable, and descend-
able, in the same manner.'' Scott on Trusts, Vol. 1, 
Par. 132. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
31 
"On the whole, it seen1s probable that, in except 
a very small number of jurisdictions, contingent re-
mainders and executory interests of all kinds, are 
freely alienable. McAdams vs. Bailey, 82 N.E. 1057; 
169 Ind. 518, 13 L.R.A.A.N.S. 1003; Beacom vs Amos, 
77 S.E. 407; 161 N.C. 717; Lee vs. Oates, 171 N.C. 717 
Ann. Cas. 1917 A 514; Habgood vs. Habgood, 86 S. 
E. 189; 171 N. C. 485; Love vs. Lindstedt, 147 P. 935 
76 Ore. 66, Ann. Cas., 1917A 898; Jerman vs. Nelson, 
135 Ore. 126; 293 Pac. 592; Re Robbins Estate, 49 
A. 233, 199 Pa. 500." Simes 4:'Future Interests," ( 1936) 
Vol. 3, page 159. Par. 714. 
"It thus appears that, \vhether there be any ap-
plicable statute or not, any variety of future interests 
in land may be conveyed by release, by estoppal, or 
by contract, specifically enforeable in equity, if there 
is any person capable of executing a deed who may 
be said to have a future interest.'" Simes "Future 
Interests" Vol. 3_ Par. 710, page 150. 
In Blair vs. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 
300 U. S. 5, 81 L. Ed. 465, the will provided for the cre-
ation of the trust estate and for the payment by the 
tn1stees of the income from the estate to the son of his 
testator. 
The Court in commenting on the right of the bene-
ficiary to assign his interest said: 
"The will creating the trust entitled the peti-
tioner during his life to the net income of the pro~ 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
32 
perty held in trust. He thus became the owner of 
an equitable interest in the corpus of the property. 
Brown v. Fletcher, 235 U. S. 589, 598, 599, 59 L. ed. 
374, 378, 35 S. Ct. 154; Irwin v. Gavit, 268 U. S. 
161, 167, 168, 69 L. ed. 897, 898, 899; 45 S. Ct. 475; 
Senior v. Braden 295 U.S. 422, 432, 433, 79 L.ed. 1520, 
1525, 1526, 55 S. Ct. 800, 100 A.L.R. 794; Merchants' 
Loan & T. Co. vs. Patterson, 308 Ill. 519, 530, 139 
N .E. 912. By virtue of that interest he was entitled 
to enforce the trust, to have a breach of trust en-
joined and to obtain redress in case of breach. The 
interest was present property alienable like· any other, 
in the absence of a valid restraint upon alienation. 
Commissioner of Internal Revenue vs. Field C.C.A. 
(2d) 42 F. (2d) 820, 822; Shanley v. Bowers C.C.A. 
(2d) 81 F. (2d) 13, 15. The beneficiary may thus 
transfer a part of his interest as well as the whole. 
See Am. Law Inst. Restatement, Trusts, vol. 1 Par. 
130, 132, et. to seq. The assignment of the beneficial 
interest is not the assignment of a chose in action but 
of the "right, title and estate in and to property." 
While our own court has not passed directly on the 
question in Latimer vs. Holliday, 103 Utah 152; 134 Pac. 
( 2d) 183, it ruled: 
"Where the assignment of an expectancy is 
fair, made, supported by fair consideration, equity 
will enforce it if not contrary to public policy." 
Even the cases cited by plaintiff do not justify the 
conclusion that the mere vesting of title in the trustee 
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prevents the beneficiary from disposing of the same dur-
ing the trust period. 
In Re: Blakes Estate (ante), the testator gave pro-
perty to trustees to hold for his two daughters and a 
granddaughter. When each of the beneficiaries attained 
the age of 30 years, they were to receive from the trustees 
one-third of the property. The granddaughter died at 
the age of 27 and the Court was called upon to determine 
whether her one-third share would pass to her children. 
The Court gave the property to the children of said de-
cedent holding that even though the granddaughter died 
before she attained the age of 30 years, her children would 
take her share as purchasers under the will. 
The trust created in the cases of Meeks vs. Briggs, 
Everitt vs. Haskins, and Watts vs. McKay are all discre-
tionary trust and are disposed of in Re Watts vs. McKay 
as follows: 
"To the same effect, it is said in Vol. 1, Scott on 
Trusts, page 77 4; "Where by the terms of the trust 
a beneficiary is entitled only to so much of the in-
come or p1incipal as the trustee in his uncontrolled 
discretion shall see fit to give him, he cannot compel 
the trustee to pay to him or to apply for his use any 
part of the tn1s_t property. In such a case, an assignee 
of the interest of the beneficiary cannot compel the 
trustee to pay any part of the trust property, nor can 
creditors of the beneficiary reach any part of the 
trust property. This is true even in jurisdictions 
where spendthrift trust are not permitted. If the 
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benefiicary himself cannot compel the trustee to pay 
over any part of the trust fund, his assignee and his 
creditors are in no beter position. It is the character 
of the benficiary;l s interest, rather than the settlor:~ s 
intention to impose a restraint on its alienation, which 
prevents its being reached." (italics supplied). Also 
see 26 R.C.L. 1268; 65 C. J. 557. Certainly the in-
stant trust is purely discretionary as to the principal, 
since-in the absence of abuse of discretion-the trus-
tee may withhold it altogether from the beneficiary 
if in his judgment the beneficiary is not capable of 
handling it. The trustee's testimony as to lack of 
capacity was not controverted and no showing made 
that the trustee had abused his discretion." 
There is nothing in the will of Olif Cronquist that 
imposes any discretion on the part of trustee and the trust 
therein created could not be classed as a discretionary 
trust. 
In Richardson vs. Warfield, (ante) the will porvided 
that the real and personal property given to the tru.stee 
"shall not be subject to any assignment, sale, or draft," 
and the Court simply held "the clause in the will provid-
ing that the property given to the trustees should not be 
subject to any assignment, sale, or order, made it impos-
sible for George A. Willis to pass any title by the assign-
ment which he undertook to make. Thus the estate of 
the benficiary was an equitable one and inalienable under 
the terms of the will." Inalienable because of the express 
terms of the will and not, as contended for by appellant, 
inalienable because of the very nature of the trust. 
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The final point contended for by the appellant and 
pleaded in his complaint (Tran. 007) is that the 
estate of the plaintiff being a contingent remainder only 
could not be alienated. This point is not argued in plain-
tiff's brief. Either the point has been abandoned or pur-
posely omitted to mis-lead respondent. 
Neither can it be said that the provision in the will 
for the estate to go to the grandchildren on the death of a 
child created in the child a contingent remainder that 
could not be alienated. The expression "or to their heirs 
at law per stirpes and not per capita" is one favored by 
the testator. He uses it not less than eleven times. (See 
paragraphs 2, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 12, and 13 of the will.) 
Paragraph 7 of the will provides; "To my sons Heber 
and Elam, or to their heirs per stirpes and not per capita 
I give, devise and bequeath my farm machinery. Because 
of this provision could it be said that Heber had only a 
contingent remainder in the farm machinery and he could 
not sell the same? 
Likewise in paragraph 5, of the same will the testator 
devises to Elam and Margaret, "or !O their heirs per stirp·es 
and not per capita,"' certain real estate. Does appellant 
contenq that the interest of Margaret and Elam in said 
real estate could not be assigned? 
Why then should these same words show that the 
testator had a different intent simply because they are 
found in paragraph 3? 
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Instead of arguing that such expression created an 
estate that could not be sold why not seek a more con-
sistent explanation. 
In Gibbens v. Gibbens 140 Mass. 102, 3 N.E. 1 the 
court declares: "An argument in favor of contingency is 
drawn from the use of the words the issue of the deceased 
child standing in the place of the parent. It is argued that 
such issue, if there were any, would take at all events; that 
the parent could not have disposed of his or her share, to 
their exclusion .and that therefore the interest of the par-
ent was not an absolute vested one. It is quite natural 
and probable to infer that the words above quoted were 
used for the purpose of showing clearly that the testator 
did not intend the devise to lapse in case of the death 
of one of his children leaving issue. Words to the effect 
that the issue of deceased children shall take by right of 
representation are not uncommon in wills, \Vhen strictly 
speaking, they are entirely unnecessary; and the use of 
so fan1iliar and common expression does not carry with 
it is strong inference that the testator thereby designed 
to express so1ne pecu~iar intention with reference to the 
vesting or contingency of the interest devised." 
CONCLUSION 
'iV e therefore submit; ( 1. that because no spendthrift 
was created and 2. the interest of plaintiffs in the trust pro-
perty could be alienated) that the District Court did not 
err when it ruled that the Plaintiff and Appellant should 
be bound by his contract to convey to the Defendant his 
"Lu1divided one-third interest in the property. That the 
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Defendant having paid $4,000.00 on the contract and by 
stipulation having deposited the balance of $6,000.00 with 
the First Security Bank of Logan, as per stipulation of the 
parties, (Tr. 019-22) is now entitled to a deed to the 
property. 
Respectively submitted 
L. TOM PERRY 
GROVER GILES 
S. D. HUFFAKER 
Attorneys for Defendant 
and Respondent. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
INDEX TO BRIEF 
Pages 
Statement of Additional Facts ---------------------------------------- 1-2 
Argument and Authorities --------:-------------------------------------- 3-37 
INDEX TO CASES AND AUTHORITIES 
54 Am. Jur. pages 125, 128 -------------------------------------------- 3-22 
Baker vs. Keiser, 75 Md. 332, 23 Alt. 735 ------------------------ 25 
Blair vs. Blair, 27 4 Ill. App. 23 ---------------------------------------- 10 
Blair vs. Comm. of Internal Rev. 300 U. S. 5, 81 L. 
Ed. 465 ______ -- ___ --- __ -_ __ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ___ __ _ ____ _ _ _ _____ __ _ __ _ _ __ ___ _ _ _ _ ____ _ 13, 31 
Bogert on Trusts, Vol. 1. Par. 188, 225 page 739 ______ 22, 30 
Com. of Internal Rev. vs. Blair 60 Fed. (2nd) 340 __________ 8 
65 c. J. 265, 542 ------------------------------------------------------------------ 23 
Griswold on Spendthrift Trusts, pages 38, 300, 270, 
303, 304, 634 -----------~---------------~-~------------------------------ 3, 21 
Kelley vs. Kelley (Calif.) 79 Pac. (2nd) 1059 ________________ 15 
Kales, "Future Interests" page 861, and Par. 7 48 ____________ 10 
Latimer vs. Holladay 103 Utah 152, 134 Pac. (2nd) 
183 ------------------------------ -------------------- ------------------------------ 32 
Miller vs. Maryland Casualty Co. 180 S.W. 581 ____________ 24 
Nun vs. Fitchie-Gorttenger 245 S.W. 19 -------------------------- 26 
Newell vs. Tubbs (Colo.) 84 Pac. (2nd) 820. ________________ 23 
O'Hare vs. Johnson 113 N .E. 127 -------------------------------- 6, 28 
Pickens vs. Dorris 20 Mo. App. 1 -------------------------------------- 25 
Pool vs. Cross Countrv Bank 133 S.W. 19 
" 
2 R.C.L. page 357 ------------------------------------------------------ 24 
Simes on Future Interests Vol. 3, pages 150, 159 __________ 31 
Scott on Trusts Vol. 1. Par. 132 ---------------------------------- 30, 33 
Trask vs. Shaffer ( Pa.) 14 Alt. (2nd) 211 ------------------·-··-· 4 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
